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Radicalisation, the process by which ordinary individuals
come to sympathise with and support violent protests
and terrorism, is thought to include both social and
psychological determinants and vulnerabilities that shape
otherwise healthy young people to engage with and adopt
terrorist ideology.1 Actual terrorist offending is rare and has
challenged a wide array of experts from a variety of different
disciplines including historians, scientists, forensic, health
and social care professionals, and stakeholders from the
criminal justice agencies. Preventing radicalisation and
terrorism is even less well understood, and has a smaller
evidence base than homicide. There is insufﬁcient research
evidence to propose any single model or mechanism by
which radicalisation leads to terrorism, and then even less
that is consistent about the role of mental illness, although
more is emerging about the role of emotional and
psychological factors.2 Most knowledge about terrorism
comes from reconstructed biographies of convicted terrorists
where pathways are sought from ordinary citizen to a phase of
pre-radicalisation, followed by indoctrinated commitment to
terrorist causes.2,3 These retrospective accounts cannot be
veriﬁed objectively and are subject to recall bias but adopt the
only approach known in criminological investigations.
Further arrest and conviction necessarily lead the individual
to re-envisioning their identity and sense of belonging.
Their own narrative of who they are and what has happened
is shaped by the need to justify their actions when asked to
explain how they came to commit offences labelled as
terrorism.2,3
Little research has explored the early phase of
radicalisation in the UK and other high-income countries,
when individuals turn on their countries and give up
friendships, family, freedom and opportunity available to
them. Even less research has explored how ordinary people
living in the community, ostensibly gaining from and giving
to their society, decide to attack their community and
country.4
Terrorism seeks to secure political objectives through
violence, fear and intimidation of both populations and
politicians. Consequently, governments are obliged to
respond by attempting to secure the safety of their citizens
as well as entering into international negotiations on
foreign policy, security and counter-terrorism strategies.
Although terrorism has a long history, the recent discourse
foregrounds people of Muslim heritage in high-income
countries such as the UK, the USA, Canada and Australia.
More recently, France and Belgium have been drawn into
this concern.5 It is known that the vast majority of terrorist
offences take place in countries with a Muslim majority and
low levels of income, and indeed the victims are mostly of
Muslim heritage, although the evidence for terrorism being
linked to Muslim countries is not universal as many such
countries enjoy peace and prosperity.6
The immediacy of terrorist threats, often unexpected
and in spite of signiﬁcant counter-terrorism intelligence
and investment, has provoked a crisis in conﬁdence and
strategy, leading to calls for urgent intervention locally and
internationally. Within this counter-terrorism discourse,
the place of religious ideology is conﬂated with orthodox
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religious beliefs, and the political basis of terrorist acts
disguised as religious rhetoric is overlooked. Attacking
terrorism through a religious idiom is not soundly based
on evidence. Not all Muslims are at risk of terrorism and
many Muslim countries do not experience terrorism.
Extremist political interpretations are a minority but are
reacted to as if these are mainstream religious beliefs. If
clinicians are asked to make judgements about terrorism
risk, radicalisation or even cultural variations of religious
practices and whether these fall within norms, then
community advocacy and partnership is required to help
make those judgements. Clinicians are also expected to ask
about and problematise the nature of religious beliefs and
the boundaries with political beliefs. This very topic has
been contentious. On the one hand, professional secular
boundaries are necessary to protect the patient and
clinician in areas of ethical controversy,7 but a culturally
sensitive and competent enquiry is necessary to discern
delusional beliefs, as distinct from culturally acceptable
beliefs and religious practices.
In part the strategy of terrorism is to provoke a
Draconian, oppressive counter-response in order to
exonerate perpetrators and vilify governments of Western
democracies, which then risk an unwanted by-product.
If policies target Muslim or religious populations, it
demonstrates to people of Muslim heritage, or strong
religious afﬁliations, that they are not valued equally to
other citizens; indeed, their role in resolution and
protection of their society is not recognised or exploited
to promote cohesion and safer societies. Religiosity itself
becomes a source of suspicion and concern. Understanding
the construction of religious experience and the psychological
costs of holding religious beliefs (perhaps with contradictory
and contested evidence, hence the need for faith and belief )
is the subject of much cultural, philosophical and
neuroscientiﬁc research.8 We need to know far more in
order to separate beliefs that are benignly religious from
those that include political motivations and incite violence
but are disguised through religious rhetoric; without this
knowledge clinicians would face an onerous and unscientiﬁc
set of expectations. Regrettably, the current UK govern-
ment’s counter-terrorism responses, speciﬁcally the Prevent
programme, have been criticised for begetting exactly this
unintended consequence.
The most recent counter-terrorism Bill seeks to invoke
a public duty on all citizens and public servants of
identifying a potential terrorist threat as early as possible.
The implications for healthcare and educational institutions
and other employing organisations are that they should
have a responsibility to carry a high index of suspicion.
Further, they are obliged to intervene when they come
across seemingly suspicious individuals or groups who
might be harbouring terrorist intentions. Although well-
intentioned, this proposal has been met with a rather more
concrete interpretation by some in public institutions. For
example, in education, even in primary schools, enthusiastic
early adopters misclassiﬁed individuals as being a potential
terrorist threat without fully appreciating the lack of any
valid method of prediction.
In mental health services, there exists a special concern
that people with poor psychological health and psychiatric
difﬁculties are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and
persuasion, especially if they are additionally distressed and
isolated and should come into contact with nefarious,
infectious terrorist ideology. Emerging information suggests
that those who commit terrorist offences rarely have severe
mental illnesses, speciﬁcally disorders with symptoms of
hallucinations and delusions. Nevertheless, it is sometimes
difﬁcult to disentangle political ideology and commitment
from delusional or overvalued ideas, when these are held by
a peer group from a similar cultural background, even if
a minority.8,9 In rare situations it has been found that
so-called ‘lone wolves’ acting in isolation from persuasive
terrorist organisations appear to be at high risk of having
mental health problems and acting erratically and perhaps
impulsively, to seek redress for perceived insult or assault
on their cultural religious beliefs, assuming the terrorist
ideology to be true.10 In addition, vulnerable individuals
seek potent self-identity and inﬂuence through joining
gangs or shared interest groups, perhaps not realising the
gravity of potential offending in which they may be later
involved. Forensic psychiatrists and psychologists of course
have to debate these issues daily. But terrorism is a form of
offending given special status and investment as the new
evil that must be combated. It is with this zeal that some
interpret their public duties.
In mental healthcare we are experienced in managing
risks of suicide, self-harm, violence and homicide. Accepting
that the science of prediction of rare events is limited, it is
necessary to follow established safeguarding processes and
procedures in an effort to minimise the potential for
unwanted outcomes.
The UK government’s counter-terrorism provisions
could be understood in this context: they are perhaps
simply asking us to ensure we maintain a high index of
suspicion, optimal safeguarding, and most importantly, do
not consider concerns about potential terrorist offending to
be outside the remit of our public duties as citizens. The
implementation of such activities may be difﬁcult to marry
up with the responsibilities of a healthcare professional or
indeed any other public servant, as it requires more
resources and time, as well as discussion and documentation.
It also risks stigma and the alienation of people seeking help
from any ofﬁcial service or channel.
I have some sympathy with Derek Summerﬁeld’s
position11 in that medical ethics mandate conﬁdentiality
and the protection of an individual’s medical information
and health, although clearly this has to be balanced with
considerations of risk to others. Yet the implication that
health professionals are somehow to routinely seek out any
indexof potential terrorismoverstates the scientiﬁc knowledge
aboutwho is a terrorist offender, and aboutwhat radicalisation
is as a process and who might be vulnerable to it.
Further deﬁciencies in scientiﬁc knowledge fail to help
us understand how radical ideas can exist as extremist
political ideology or philosophy, and how political ideology
seeks to exploit religious rhetoric, as if appealing to all
people of Muslim heritage. In our studies of sympathies
for violent protest and terrorism among South Asian
populations of Muslim heritage, ordinary citizens living in
the community, mostly employed and educated, we found
the stereotypical characteristics such as poverty disadvantage
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and discriminatory experiences as unimpressive correlates
of pre-radicalisation sympathies.12,13 Migrants in fact were
less likely to hold such views as were those with poor health
and living in areas of low social capital. Similarly, work
undertaken by specialist researchers working for govern-
ments and independent researchers has not identiﬁed a
range of predictive variables, reinforcing that the only
approach available is one of safeguarding, careful risk
assessment and management. It is known that patient and
public involvement improve the quality of public health and
societal research, especially in the realm of preventive
science, so more active involvement of communities is
needed. Although research on those at risk of offending or
convicted terrorists is necessary, considerable care needs to
be exercised with regard to ethics and safety of researchers
and the public, as well as to not undermine the efforts of
criminal justice agencies.
In part the appeal of the terrorist threat is an infectious
but noxious idea with which to grapple, reﬂecting the
human fascination with transformation from hero to villain,
as exempliﬁed in popular ﬁlm, children’s cartoons, and
theatre. Woody and Buzz Lightyear in the ﬁlm Toy Story,
Flash Gordon ﬁghting an emperor, Luke Skywalker in Star
Wars, and Harry Potter all struggle with their identity as
villain or hero. All battle malevolent forces while being
changed by them, and yet surviving, overcoming and
defeating the appeal of violence and evil which is portrayed
as pleasurable. We must ensure our counter-terrorism
response and public citizen duties do not engage with the
realms of fantasy. They must be subject to intense,
intelligent, evidence-based efforts to safeguard our patients
wherever possible, while at the same time promoting mental
health and well-being even in treacherous times of conﬂict
and, for some, ﬁnancial ruin and disconnection. All should
prioritise safeguarding, while doing away with policies
without evidence.
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